People v. Lampkin, 2025 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7786 (Cal. Ct. App. 2025)

The Third District Court of Appeal in California vacated a felony murder conviction based on insufficient evidence to support the state’s required “reckless indifference” finding, which must also take into consideration youthfulness at the time of the incident. The court stated in relevant part:

“Finally, defendant’s youth also cuts against a finding of reckless indifference. In Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 434, discussing the culpability of a minor defendant, the court stated: “To the extent the Clark factors discussed ante support a finding of reckless indifference for an adult—an issue we do not decide today—those factors undoubtedly preclude such a finding when viewed from the lens of Moore’s youth. In particular, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Moore was subjectively aware that his actions created a graver risk of death than any other armed robbery.” (Id. at p. 454.)

Although Moore involved a minor, youthfulness as a factor relevant to a criminal defendant’s ability to perceive risk and consequences, and to the level of culpability, has been extended to defendants in their late teens and early twenties. (People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 416-417 [21-year-old defendant]; People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1092-1093 [20-year-old defendant]; People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 586 [18-year-old defendant].) Moreover, in extending youth offender parole provisions to offenders as old as 25 years of age when they committed their crimes (see Stats. 2017, ch. 675, § 1), “the Legislature cited ‘[r]ecent neurological research show[ing] that cognitive brain development continues well beyond age 18 and into early adulthood.’ [Citations.]” (In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 432.)

Defendant was 23 years old. In People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, the appellate court declined to decide whether a 23-year-old defendant “fit the definition of ‘youthful‘” because any assumed error in failing to consider youth as a factor “was harmless because there was no evidence that Oliver’s criminal behavior was motivated by impulsivity or vulnerability to peer pressure, two hallmarks of youthful offenders.” (Jimenez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 1003, quoting Oliver, at pp. 488-489.) Here, Owens’s testimony supports a conclusion that defendant was susceptible to his influence as an older gang member fresh out of prison. Owens thought he could manipulate defendant into helping. Owens used the respect he believed defendant had for him as leverage to convince defendant to participate in the planned robbery. Although defendant was 23 years old, his vulnerability to manipulation from an older gang member makes his youth a relevant factor in this case. Such youth “‘diminishes any inference he acted with reckless disregard for human life’ during the armed robbery” (Keel, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 562, quoting Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 990) by making it less likely he “was subjectively aware that his actions created a graver risk of death than any other armed robbery.” (Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 454.)”

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Categories: Court Decisions, Resource Library
Tags: Adjudication, Age as Mitigation, Evidence, Felony Murder, Mens Rea