State v. Villalobos, 2026 N.M. LEXIS 83 (N.M. 2026)

The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that a young person’s age and intellectual disability are relevant considerations in determining whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. In State v. Villalobos, the Court held that an individual who had an intellectual disability and was 15 years old at the time of the underlying incident was deprived of his speedy trial rights where a large reason for the delay was due to defense counsel’s negligence in timely scheduling a competence evaluation.

The court stated in relevant part:  Surely one might expect a criminal defendant’s young age and intellectual disability to constitute relevant considerations in evaluating the fairness and efficacy of a prolonged and potentially oppressive pretrial incarceration. See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 35 (identifying the three potential sources of prejudice caused by delay as (1) “oppressive pretrial incarceration,” (2) “anxiety and concern of the accused,” and (3) impairment of the defense (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). And there is sufficient authority nationwide to justify such an expectation. See, e.g., Khalifa v. Cash, 594 F. App’x. 339, 342-43 (9th Cir. 2014) (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, that “‘time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on the individual,'” in concluding that the habeas petitioner’s “three-and-a-half year pretrial incarceration and the anxiety it caused him—a teenager awaiting trial for felony murder—weigh in favor of finding that [the petitioner] was prejudiced by the delay”); United States v. Rogers, 781 F. Supp. 1181, 1189-90 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (recognizing that prejudice may arise from a defendant’s advancing age and cognitive decline following an indictment, where the “defendant’s impaired cognitive functions” prevented him from “meaningfully assist[ing] in his defense”); State ex rel. Miller v. Craft, 337 So. 2d 1191, 1194-95 (La. 1976) (acknowledging that the court was left to “speculate on the degree of anxiety engendered in an accused” with an apparent intellectual disability who, among other things, was “incarcerated for almost two years” and concluding “that the interests sought to be protected by the right to a speedy trial have been violated”). Just as a defendant’s young age and intellectual disability can have a substantial impact on their ability to assert their speedy trial rights, so too should those same traits play a substantial role in determining whether a given defendant has suffered undue prejudice in a particular case. To the extent the Court of Appeals’ opinion below, Villalobos, A-1-CA-39820, mem. op. ¶ 30, may support a contrary conclusion, it should not be followed.