B.A. v. State 100 N.E. 3d 225 (Ind. 2018)
The Indiana Supreme Court found that B.A. was in police custody and under police interrogation when he was taken to the Vice Principal’s office, interviewed and asked to write down information related to a bomb threat at school.
The court stated in relevant part: “Ultimately, as the law-enforcement presence grows in today’s schools, so does the discussion of students’ rights. See, e.g., Holland, supra, at 39. One of those rights—the right against self-incrimination—“reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations,” including “our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to . . . self-accusation.” Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 299 (1981) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998)). Indeed, the right, “while sometimes ‘a shelter to the guilty,’ is often ‘a protection to the innocent.’” Id. at 299–300 (quoting Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55). Because of that important role, as explained below, the right against self-incrimination is protected by Miranda warnings.
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Despite B.A.’s youth and the severity of the situation, no one called his mom until after his interview. This left him in an unfamiliar, police-overshadowed situation without parental or other support. See Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 437, 440, 288 N.E.2d 138, 141, 142 (1972), superseded by statute, Indiana’s juvenile waiver statute, P.L. 1-1997. No one told B.A. that he was free to call his mother, leave the room, take a break, or go to class. See C.H., 763 N.W.2d at 715 (finding it “crucial” whether juveniles are told they are free to leave). Instead, after the interview and, finally, a brief meeting with B.A.’s mother, officers arrested B.A. to take him “downtown” to the juvenile detention center. See Howes, 565 U.S. at 509 (noting that whether the interviewee is released after questioning matters in the custody analysis).
As the State points out, no one yelled at or threatened B.A. Still, the consistent police presence would place considerable coercive pressure on a reasonable student in B.A.’s situation. So this case lies solidly on the “custody” end of the student-confinement spectrum. See S.G., 956 N.E.2d at 676.
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Officer Tutsie himself prepared a handwriting test, handed it to B.A., and explained to B.A. how to copy the sentences. As he testified, this test “was investigation material that only a police officer can probably have experience to do.” And its aim was obtaining a sample to compare to the pink-marker bomb threat.
Then, Officer Lyday told B.A., “Come on, man, just—just tell the truth.” In context, B.A. surely saw this for what it was: an order to fess up. This tag-team probe, though limited, was interrogation because the officers should have known that it was “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response,” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. And it worked, finally prompting B.A.’s tearful confession and trip to juvenile detention.”
