Developmental Science Scholars and Nonprofits Amicus Brief, People v. Taylor
This amicus brief by forty developmental science scholars and nonprofits argues transformative growth during ages 18-20 makes mandatory LWOP for individuals in that age range a disproportionate sentence in violation of Article 1, Section 16 of the Michigan constitution.
From the Summary of the Argument:
“People v Parks held that Article 1, Section 16 of the Michigan Constitution prohibits the Government from condemning late adolescents aged 18 at the time of their offenses to mandatory LWOP because the “fail[ure] to take into account the mitigating characteristics of youth, specifically late-adolescent brain development” renders those sentences disproportionate and unlawful. Parks, 510 Mich at 232.
Parks centered on the modern scientific consensus, detailed in amici’s brief filed in Parks as well as this Brief, that “[t]he brains of 18-year-olds, just like those of their juvenile counterparts, transform as they age, allowing them to reform into persons who are more likely to be capable of making more thoughtful and rational decisions,” such that those “same features that characterize the late-adolescent brain also diminish the culpability of these youthful offenders, rendering them less culpable.” Id. at 258–59. As amici’s earlier brief explained and as Parks expressly found, brain and behavioral maturation throughout late adolescence means that late adolescents, “like their juvenile counterparts, are generally capable of significant change and a turn toward rational behavior that conforms to societal expectations as their cognitive abilities develop further.” Id. at 258. These findings led this Court to conclude that, given “the dynamic neurological changes that late adolescents undergo as their brains develop over time and essentially rewire themselves, automatic condemnation to die in prison at 18 is beyond severity—it is cruelty.” Id.
Parks addressed an as-applied challenge, and so this Court only had occasion to extend the Michigan Constitution’s protections for late adolescents aged 18 like defendant Kemo Parks at the time of his offense. Yet, there is no question that every ounce of the Court’s findings and reasoning in Parks involving late adolescents aged 18—i.e., the scientific consensus on their ongoing brain and behavioral development during late adolescence; its impact on their propensity for risky, impulsive, and peer-induced behavior; its implications for their remarkable rehabilitative potential; and the constitutional protections guaranteed to them by Article 1, Section 16—“applies in equal force” to all late adolescents aged 18-20. Id. at 241, 249–52, 257–59, 264–66. Indeed, the leading studies in developmental science, many authored by amici themselves and cited favorably throughout Parks, focused on and made findings for late adolescents aged 18-20 as a group, without distinguishing 18-year-olds.
Given all this, the Government’s position here, that this Court should forsake Michigan’s constitutional safeguards against mandatory LWOP for late adolescents, is simply irreconcilable with developmental science and with Parks itself. The Government’s arguments also stand in stark tension with its implicit concession in Parks “that, in terms of neurological development, there is no meaningful distinction” between adolescents under 18 and late adolescents. Id. at 252. So just as mandatory LWOP constitutes a disproportionate sentence for 18-year-olds because it fails to account for their mitigating attributes of late adolescence, such a harsh sentence equally offends Article 1, Section 16 when imposed on late adolescents aged 19-20 who share those same mitigating characteristics.
Accordingly, amici respectfully submit that this Court should invalidate Appellants’ mandatory LWOP sentences and reverse the judgments below.”
