Heard v. City of Plainfield, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213161 (D.N.J. 2025)
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey heard two Motions to Dismiss filed by the Plainfield Public School District, Board of Education, and others, stemming out of a lawsuit filed by fifteen-year-old I.A.’s parents after the detention, search, arrest and prosecution of I.A., by Plainfield school officials and Plainfield Police Officers.
In making its findings on the Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss, the Court made several findings regarding the search and seizure of I.A. and provided the following rationale in support:
“Here, because no “limited exception” applies to the Police Defendants’ search of I.A., the search “require[d] either a warrant or probable cause.” Shuman ex rel. Shertzer, 422 F.3d at 147. Because the police searched I.A. spontaneously, i.e., without a warrant, they needed to have probable cause to justify their actions, but they did not. (ECF No. 35 ¶¶ 35, 36, 40, 42 (describing that the police presence at Plainfield High School was spurred by a report that a then-yet-to-be identified student had brought a firearm to the school).)
“The probable cause inquiry is ‘commonsense,’ ‘practical,’ and ‘nontechnical;’ it is based on the totality of the circumstances and is judged by the standard of ‘reasonable and prudent men.’” United States v. Lackey, No. 20-2977, 2022 WL 313807, at *2 (3d Cir. 2022). As alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, PPD officers “purportedly noticed a group of students, including I.A., ‘passing bags’ to each other.” While it is not wholly evident what “passing bags” means, Plaintiff goes on to say that I.A. was “engaged in normal . . . behavior.” Therefore, construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as the Court must at the motion to dismiss stage, Phillips, 515 F.3d at 228, the Court understands “passing bags” to be nothing more than an innocuous activity, such as an exchange of backpacks. Even “considering all . . . the surrounding circumstances,” Police Defendants could not conclude that there was a “substantial chance of criminal activity.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244, n.13 (2018)). Therefore, Plaintiff asserts facts sufficient to state a claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because merely witnessing some harmless activity alone is not enough to establish probable cause. See D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 61 (2018).
However, this is not the case here, where Plaintiff alleges that the search turned up “no evidence of illegality or misconduct,” which is consistent with the alleged fact that the Juvenile Complaint was later “dismissed in its entirety . . . for lack of . . . probable cause to support I.A.’s arrest.” (ECF No. 35 ¶¶ 46, 54, 56.) Additionally, Plaintiff alleges the Juvenile Complaint “makes no mention of the discovery of any knife or that I.A. was found to be in possession of a knife.” (Id. ¶ 60.) Given the total absence of facts and circumstances that could substantiate a reasonable police officer to believe that “an offense ha[d] been or [was] being committed,” the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently pled an absence of probable cause to justify Police Defendants’ “hours” long detention of I.A. (Id. ¶ 46.) Therefore, Plaintiff has stated a claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to Police Defendants’ seizure of I.A.
Based on the facts pled in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, School Defendants did not have the required probable cause. School Defendants noticed “I.A. ‘passing bags’ [before] “forcibly remov[ing] him from the cafeteria[.]” (ECF No. 35 ¶¶ 43, 45.) That, by itself, cannot establish probable cause, Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175–76, or even reasonable suspicion. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (“We have described reasonable suspicion simply as ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.” (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–418 (1981)); see also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
33 (1963) (“This Cour[t] [has a] long-established recognition that standards of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment are not susceptible of Procrustean application”; “[e]ach case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Though the school was initially on alert because of a potential firearm threat that had nothing to do with I.A. (id. ¶ 43), any connection between the then-resolved security concern and witnessing I.A. “passing bags” was tenuous at best. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (“[A] student search is reasonable if it is . . . justified at its inception.” (internal quotation omitted)); see also Gov’t of Virgin Island In Int. of K.O., No. 141/2004, 2004 WL 3558508 (Terr. V.I. Dec. 14, 2004) (holding that a search was “not justified at its inception” when the minor was not “engaged in any unlawful conduct or threatening behavior when he was searched”). Therefore, the school’s search of I.A., in conjunction with law enforcement, was not supported by probable cause.
As articulated in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, given the duration of the detention, the conditions of the confinement—specifically the prolonged use of handcuffs—the presence of law enforcement, and, most importantly, the fact that School Defendants had no real reason to suspect that I.A. was engaging in some unlawful conduct, as pled, School Defendant’s seizure of I.A. was unreasonable as it lacked probable cause.”
