In re C.M., 2026 Cal. App. LEXIS 492 (Cal. Ct. App. 2026)

The California 1st District Court of Appeal reversed a probation condition authorizing the probation department to add or remove electronic monitoring without court approval, holding that it is “an impermissible delegation of the juvenile court’s authority and responsibility.” The court stated in relevant part:

The “general rule [is] that a court may dictate the basic policy of a condition of probation, leaving specification of details to the probation officer.” (Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 919.) So long as the supervisory discretion granted to the probation department is properly limited, it does not run afoul of the separation of powers doctrine (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3), which mandates that judicial powers may not be completely delegated to nonjudicial officers, including probation officers. (In re Travis J. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 187, 194, fn. 3; see In re Pedro Q. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1368, 1372 [”It is well settled that courts may not delegate the exercise of their discretion to probation officers.”].)

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We conclude that deciding whether to impose electronic monitoring represents “a significant aspect of the court’s legal control of the minor” and the condition in this case impermissibly delegates “complete discretion” to the probation department to make that determination without sufficient due process protections. (See D.N., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 209 [reviewing cases in which delegation was found improper because complete discretion was given to nonjudicial persons or institutions over a significant aspect of the court’s legal control of the minor].)