In re T.A., 2025-Ohio-3079 (Ohio Ct. App. 2025)

The 10th District Ohio Court of Appeals reversed a judgment of voluntary manslaughter because the youth’s admission was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered and offered the following language in support.

“Ultimately, “[t]he purpose of Juv.R. 29(D) is to ensure that any decision by the accused to forgo his or her constitutional right to a trial, representation, to confront accusers, call witnesses, and to be unanimously found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is made freely, with actual understanding of both the nature of the charges the juvenile is facing and knowledge of the full extent of penalties that could be levied as a result of the plea.” In re B.B., 2013-Ohio-1958, ¶ 9 (7th Dist.). Thus, even though Juv.R. 29(D) does not expressly require the trial court to advise a juvenile of the right to have the prosecution prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, this obligation is implicit insofar as the waiver of this constitutional right is a consequence of the admission. See In re Lorraine, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3536, *6 (11th Dist. Aug. 10, 2001) (finding the trial court complied with Juv.R. 29(D) by, in part, “instruct[ing] appellant that the burden is on the State of Ohio to prove all of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and that he could not be compelled to testify.”). Therefore, just as is required for a criminal defendant’s guilty plea, a trial court must advise a juvenile, admitting to a criminal offense, of the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the admission does not comply with constitutional due process requirements and is not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.

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Here, at the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court asked T.A. whether his counsel had explained to him, and he understood, the charges against him and the potential penalty. The trial court also asked T.A. if he understood “that there are implications which had been discussed by counsel for the State and your attorney?” (May 18, 2023 Tr. at 9.) T.A. answered affirmatively in response to these questions. But reliance on counsel or the state informing a juvenile of the potential consequences of the juvenile‘s admission does not comply with the rule’s requirement that the trial court personally address the juvenile and convey the consequences of an admission. The trial court must advise the juvenile of the specific term of commitment to the ODYS he or she may face, and the failure to so advise means the trial court has failed to substantially comply with Juv.R. 29(D). In re T.B. at ¶ 9. See In re A.R., 2017-Ohio-8058, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.) (holding the trial court did not substantially comply with Juv.R. 29(D) when it “did not explain [to the juvenile] the minimum or maximum terms of commitment that may result in the acceptance of an admission”). Because the trial court did not, at T.A.’s adjudicatory hearing, explain the possible minimum or maximum terms of commitment he faced with an admission, it did not substantially comply with Juv.R. 29(D). Consequently, T.A.’s admission was invalid on this additional, independent basis.”