In the Interest of K.W.-D., 2026 Pa. Super. LEXIS 272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2026)
The Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated a probation revocation order, finding that the youth was deprived of their constitutional right to notice of the specific allegations and supporting evidence pertaining to the revocation.
The court stated in relevant part:
Based on our review, and in light of this Court’s ruling in K.G.-B., we conclude that K.W.-D. was deprived of his constitutionally protected due process rights when he was not provided with written notice of the Commonwealth’s intent to seek revocation of his probation, nor written notice of the specific allegations and evidence supporting the request for revocation, in advance of a scheduled revocation hearing. Here, the juvenile court scheduled the matter for a monthly probation review hearing. See Dispositional Review Order, 5/1/25, at 2. The order specifically listed the “Next Scheduled Court Date” as a “Review Hearing.” Id. The review hearing was subsequently rescheduled to June 16, 2025, and the juvenile court then issued a “Notice of Review Hearing” to the parties which specifically indicated that the June 16 hearing would be a “Review Hearing.” See Notice of Review Hearing, 5/1/25, at 1. At no time was K.W.-D. provided with written notice that the Commonwealth intended to seek revocation of his probation, in violation of Rule 612(A). Nor did the Commonwealth provide K.W.-D. with written notice of the specific allegations and evidence upon which it intended to rely in seeking the revocation of his probation. See K.G.-B., 2026 Pa. Super. LEXIS 98 at *22-23. The fact that the juvenile court issued a written notice of a review hearing does not satisfy or excuse the requirement for a written notice of a revocation hearing. The notice of a review hearing that was issued to K.W.-D. was constitutionally inadequate to properly advise K.W.-D. of the Commonwealth’s intent to deprive him of his liberty interest by seeking the revocation of his probation. Similarly, the fact that defense counsel may have had access to some, or even all of K.W.-D.’s progress reports, does not vitiate his right to due process with respect to the notice of the Commonwealth’s intent to revoke his probation. The mere fact that defense counsel may have been aware that K.W.-D.’s progress was lacking or that he was non-compliant with some of the conditions of his probation is of no consequence. Counsel cannot be expected to guess or surmise the potential basis or bases on which the Commonwealth might opt to seek revocation of a juvenile offender’s probation. Instead, the Commonwealth was required to provide K.W.-D. and his counsel with notice of the specific allegations and evidence supporting the request to revoke his probation. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the Commonwealth’s failure to file and serve a written motion for revocation of probation, identifying the specific bases for revocation and the evidence upon which it would rely to support those allegations, as required by Gagnon and the Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure, requires that we vacate the order revoking K.W.-D.’s probation. See K.G.-B., 2026 Pa. Super. LEXIS 98 at *22-23.
