In the Interest of W.M.H., 2025 Mo. App. LEXIS 841 (Mo. Ct. App. 2025)

The Missouri Eastern District Court of Appeals reversed a juvenile court adjudication of second-degree tampering based on insufficient evidence regarding the youth’s requisite culpable mental state. The Court stated in relevant part:

“W.M.H. argues the juvenile court erred in finding he committed second-degree tampering because there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt W.M.H. purposely or knowingly rode unlawfully in the Prius. We agree.

An individual commits second-degree tampering if he or she “[u]nlawfully rides in or upon another’s automobile[.]” Section 569.090.1 RSMo (2016). W.M.H does not dispute he rode in an automobile without the owner’s consent. Instead, W.M.H. claims there was insufficient evidence to prove he knew he did not have the owner’s consent to ride in the vehicle.

“Direct proof of a required mental state is seldom available and such intent is usually inferred from circumstantial evidence.” State v. Randle, 456 S.W.3d 535, 539 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). “A defendant’s mental state may be determined from evidence of his conduct before the act, from the act itself, and from his subsequent conduct.” Id. Intent to commit a crime can be inferred by circumstances such as the “defendant’s presence, opportunity, companionship, conduct, and flight.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). That an occupant of a vehicle knew it was stolen could be inferred from “a destroyed ignition, stolen license plates, or an altered VIN,” as well as flight. Int. of D.L.T., 673 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023); see also State v. Goodman, 531 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Mo. App. 1975) (that the defendant operated a vehicle knowing he did not have owner’s consent could be inferred by punched out ignition and twisted wires hanging from dashboard); State v. Costello, 546 S.W.2d 22, 23-24 (Mo. App. 1976) (intent could be inferred by damage to door lock, repainting of a section of a car, and the defendant’s exclusive and unexplained possession of the recently stolen vehicle).

Here, Respondent did not introduce any direct evidence W.M.H. knew he was unlawfully riding in the Prius, and the circumstantial evidence is insufficient. Respondent concedes this point. There was no evidence presented of the usual indicators of car theft, such as a destroyed ignition or exposed wires, repainting, stolen license plates, or an altered VIN. W.M.H. did not have possession of the key, nor did he attempt to flee when approached by police. W.M.H. points to two facts that could support the juvenile court’s finding—the damage to the Prius and the Hillside Meadows surveillance footage—and argues neither supports the conclusion he knew the vehicle was stolen. We agree. The damaged bumper is not an indication the Prius was stolen, as it would not aid a perpetrator in gaining entry to or starting a vehicle, as seen in Goodman and Costello. 531 S.W.2d at 778; 546 S.W.2d at 23. A messy interior and dirty exterior likewise do not indicate a stolen vehicle. Regarding the Hillside Meadows video, Detective K.A. did not identify W.M.H. as the individual exiting the Prius. Even in light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence would not permit a rational fact-finder to find W.M.H. guilty of second-degree tampering beyond a reasonable doubt.”