People v. Oslund, 2024 Mich. LEXIS 2447 (Mich. 2024)

In People v. Oslund, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s decision to transfer Evan Oslund to adult court in an assault case pursuant to an “aiding and abetting” theory.  In doing so, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that only the actions of the youth can be considered when determining whether the “juvenile is armed with a dangerous weapon” for purposes of the ‘automatic’ waiver statute in Michigan (MCLS 764.1f(2)(b)). Since there was no evidence that Evan was armed with a dangerous weapon during the assault, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to circuit court with instructions to grant Evan’s motion to quash the bindover. 

The court offered the following language in support: 

“Given the Legislature’s use of the term “the juvenile,” to obtain jurisdiction over a juvenile defendant charged with AWIGBH through the automatic waiver process, the juvenile defendant themselves must have been armed with a dangerous weapon. Only the actions of the charged juvenile defendant can be considered when determining whether the juvenile defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon for purposes of MCL 764.1f(2)(b); the actions of other individuals cannot be transferred or imputed onto the charged juvenile defendant. Stated more fully, if a codefendant or another individual is armed with a dangerous weapon during the incident in question, but the charged juvenile defendant is not, the statutory requirement under MCL 764.1f(2)(b) that the juvenile defendant be armed with a dangerous weapon has not been met. Assuming, without deciding, that the shoes worn by the two assailants were dangerous weapons and used as dangerous weapons as required by MCL 764.1f(2)(b)(iii), there was no evidence presented that defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon as required by MCL 764.1f(2)(b). Given that there was no evidence that defendant himself was armed with a dangerous weapon, the statutory requirements for automatic waiver under MCL 764.1f(2)(b) were not met, and the criminal division of the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over defendant. Accordingly, the lower courts committed an error of law when interpreting MCL 764.1f(2)(b) and abused their discretion by binding defendant over to the criminal division of the circuit court.”