People v. Reyes, 2025 IL App. (2d) 210423-B (Ill. Ct. App. 2025)

The Second District Court of Appeals in Illinois vacated a 66-year sentence finding that the trial court misinterpreted youth-related statutory factors as aggravating instead of mitigating factors. The court stated in relevant part:

“Defendant also argues that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the statutory factor of his ability to consider the risks and consequences of his behavior at the time of the offense. This evaluation is part of the first youth-related factor, which requires the sentencing court to consider “the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the offense, including the ability to consider risks and consequences of behavior, and the presence of cognitive or developmental disability, or both, if any.” Id. § 5-4.5-105(a)(1). In discussing this factor, the trial court noted that defendant was 16 at the time of the offense and that, by at least one measure, his low average intelligence put his mental age about two years behind his peers of the same age. The trial court also found there was evidence that defendant had ADHD, was impetuous, and “would act impulsively, and suffer adverse consequences for such acts.” However, it then immediately found that, despite defendant’s low average “range of functioning,” there was nothing to indicate that defendant lacked the ability to consider the risks and consequences of his behavior. This latter finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence and shows a misinterpretation of the plain statutory language.

An impaired “ability to consider the risks and consequences of behavior” refers to the young brain’s ability to accurately understand and assess the likely results of certain conduct, not simply intelligence or general ability to function. The trial court’s own finding that defendant would act impulsively despite suffering adverse consequences from his actions demonstrates that he was not able to consider the risks and consequences of his behavior. The trial court erred by ignoring this evidence and misinterpreting the statutory language to reach a contrary conclusion.”