People v. Stovall, 987 N.W.2d 85 (Mich. 2022)

In People v. Stovall, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated Stovall’s sentence of a parolable life sentence for second-degree murder finding it violated Article 1, Section 16 of the Michigan constitution prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court offered the following language in support: 

“The Michigan Constitution, however, is different. Article 1, § 16 of the Michigan Constitution provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted; nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained.” The Michigan Constitution, therefore, forbids unusually excessive imprisonment. Lorentzen, 387 Mich at 172. In Bullock, 440 Mich at 30-35, this Court held that the textual difference  between Michigan’s prohibition on “cruel or unusual punishment” and the Eighth Amendment’s bar on “cruel and unusual punishments,” the historical circumstances when the Eighth Amendment was ratified, and longstanding Michigan precedent called for a broader interpretation of Michigan’s prohibition against “cruel or unusual punishment” than the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal counterpart.  

…. 

As for the first and second Bullock factors (which go hand in hand here), a parolable life sentence is the most severe penalty that can be imposed for second-degree murder. MCL 750.317. And it is particularly severe when imposed on a juvenile, given the important mitigating ways that children are different from adults. While second-degree murder is a grave offense, the law recognizes graver yet. 

The severity of the sentence is also heightened by the fact that unlike courts sentencing juveniles who commit first-degree murder, sentencing courts who sentenced defendants like Mr. Stovall—those convicted of second-degree murder committed while they were juveniles—have not been required to consider the mitigating qualities of youth identified in Miller before imposing sentence. But see People v Boykin, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___, 2022 Mich. LEXIS 1482, *14 (2022) (Docket Nos. 157738) (courts sentencing juveniles who commit murder must consider the mitigating characteristics of youth when exercising their discretion to impose any sentence). In other words, while juveniles who commit first-degree murder will always receive a significant procedural safeguard before being sentenced to die in prison, see People v Taylor, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___, 2022 Mich. LEXIS 1484, *35 (2022) (Docket No. 154994), defendants like Mr. Stovall who commit second-degree murder as juveniles are at risk to serve precisely the same sentence without that safeguard. That is, they may receive the same sentence with less process although they have been convicted of a less serious offense. 

 As a practical matter, a parolable life sentence for second-degree murder is often more severe than the minimum sentences now given to most juveniles who commit first-degree murder: 25 to 40 years. In enacting MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a, the Legislature chose not to make a parolable life sentence the applicable sentence for juveniles who commit first-degree murder, even though the United States Supreme Court blessed parolable life as a constitutionally permissible means of accommodating its decision in Miller. See, e.g., Miller, 567 US at 489; Montgomery, 577 US at 212. When a sentence is not on the table for the most serious offense a juvenile can commit, see People v Carp, 496 Mich 440, 514; 852 NW2d 801 (2014)  (“[F]irst-degree murder is almost certainly the gravest and most serious offense that an individual can commit under the laws of Michigan[.]”), cert gtd and opinion vacated sub nom on other grounds Carp v Michigan, 577 US 1186; 136 S. Ct. 1355; 194 L. Ed. 2d 339 (2016), permitting it for a less serious offense is disproportionate and therefore cruel or unusual.”