People v. T.M., 2025 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5081 (Cal. Ct. App. 2025)

A California appellate court reversed a juvenile court’s disposition order committing a youth to a secure youth treatment facility and offered the following language in support.

“Before committing a minor to a secure facility, the court must find no less restrict alternative disposition is suitable. In making this determination, “the court shall consider all relevant and material evidence, including the recommendations of counsel, the probation department, and any other agency or individual designated by the court to advise on the appropriate disposition of the case.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 875, subd. (a)(3).) The statute also provides several criteria the court “shall” consider before committing minor to a secure facility, including “Whether the programming, treatment, and education offered and provided in a secure youth treatment facility is appropriate to meet the treatment and security needs of the ward.” (Id., subd. (a)(3)(C).)

. . . .

However, while Carlos J. recognized parties who “frequently participate in placement determinations” have knowledge of the programs available for disposition placements and they may “speak in ‘shorthand’ about placements and other matters . . . judicial review by [an appellate] court[] requires some concrete evidence in the record about relevant programs at the DJF. Otherwise, th[e] court’s review for substantial evidence is an empty exercise, not meaningful appellate review of a legal proceeding resulting in [the] commitment of a minor.” (Carlos, J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 11-12, italics omitted.)

The record before us presents the same problem—given the limited record, we cannot engage in meaningful review of the juvenile court’s commitment decision as to the specific benefits a secure facility could afford T.M. or the unsuitability of a less restrictive alternative placement. (See Carlos J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 10 [the appellate “court cannot review the adequacy of the evidence supporting the [trial court’s] finding . . . without evidence in the record of the programs . . . expected to be of benefit”]; [“judicial review by this court, requires some concrete evidence in the record about relevant programs,” otherwise “this court’s review for substantial evidence is an empty exercise”].) We must therefore reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings. In doing so, we are in no way discounting the significance of the juvenile court’s concerns about T.M.’s record of failing to abide by the terms and conditions of his multiple probations and the increasing frequency and seriousness of the crimes he has committed. These must certainly weigh in the court’s disposition determination on remand.”

 

File Type: pdf
Categories: Court Decisions, Resource Library
Tags: Disposition, Least Restrictive Alternative, Purpose Clause