State v. Evans 2026 LEXIS 83 (IL. 2026)
The Illinois Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred in applying the statutory framework when resentencing Evans under Miller and that the severity of the offense does not relieve the court of the duty to follow the law. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.
The court reasoned in part, “Evans contends that errors affected the “framework” of the resentencing hearing, rendering it an unreliable method for evaluating mitigating and aggravating evidence. See Johnson, 2024 IL 130191, ¶ 89. We agree.
Before weighing factors in aggravation and mitigation, the sentencing court stated that Evans’s eligibility for parole “removes” his sentence from “the penumbra” of Miller and later cases. See Penumbra, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (noting, in constitutional law, Supreme Court has recognized that Bill of Rights has penumbras containing implied rights). The State first advanced this framing in its resentencing memo, and the court did so at the resentencing hearing.
By focusing on parole eligibility, the State misconstrued section 5-4.5-105(a)’s codification of Miller. Indeed, by omitting any citation to or discussion of the statutory mitigating factors under section 5-4.5-105(a) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2024)) in its memo, the State left the impression that only supreme court caselaw on Miller was pertinent at resentencing.
Contrary to the State’s premise, the General Assembly’s understanding of Miller was central to the court’s sentencing decision. See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 36 (observing, section 5-4.5-105(a) contains listof mitigating factors “taken from and *** consistent with Miller’s discussion of a juvenile defendant’s youthand its attendant characteristics”). Section 5-4.5-105(a) reflects and codifies Miller ‘s insights on youth and its attendant circumstances without regard to offense type or sentence length. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(West 2024) (applying whenever “person commits an offense and the person is under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense”). In other words, the legislature understood the penumbra of Miller to sweep broadly, extending beyond the refinements of subsequent caselaw.
Miller identified several core principles: (i) juveniles have transient qualities that mitigate their crimes,(ii) these traits are not “crime specific,” and (iii) the development of a juvenile must be considered a “relevant mitigating factor of great weight.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 473, 476. While the supreme court has narrowed the circumstances in which these insights apply, the General Assembly incorporated them comprehensively so they would inform section 5-4.5-105(a)’s many factors in mitigation, again without regard to offense or sentence. See People v. Reyes,2025 IL App (2d) 210423-B, ¶ 41 (“That body decided, after due consideration and debate, to implement the teachings of Miller by enacting section 5-4.5-105 of the Code, which lists potential mitigating factors to be considered in addition to the general statutory mitigating and aggravating factors when sentencing juvenile offenders.” (Emphasis omitted.)).
At the original sentencing hearing, the trial judge remarked, “I do not know whether this defendant has any rehabilitative potential.” That uncertainty underscores the importance of the statutory protections later enacted: sentencing juveniles without the protections of section 5-4.5-105(a) leads to consequences that are “unmeasurable” and a proceeding that “cannot reliably serve its function.” See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993).
Decades later, we still lack meaningful findings about Evans’s rehabilitative potential or decision-making capacity. Proceeding under the State’s framing, the sentencing court (i) did not address a significant portion of the statutory factors, (ii) treated the planning of the offense as indicative of a lack of impetuosity and maturity, (iii) emphasized the nature of the offense while giving insufficient consideration to the implications of the science of juvenile brain development for Evans, (iv) gave no weight to Evans’s horrific life experiences in its assessment of his decision-making during the offense, and (v) failed to account for the chronology facts indicating a cessation of disciplinary incidents over time and a positive response to treatment.
By misapprehending the relationship between Miller and section 5-4.5-105(a), the State urged and the sentencing court adopted a sentencing framework that departed from the governing law. The court did not simply consider an improper factor in aggravation. See Johnson, 2024 IL 130191, ¶¶ 86-87. The court failed to perform the essential task we assigned on remand.
And just as a reviewing court will not evaluate the sufficiency of a verdict reached after an erroneous instruction on reasonable doubt (Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281), we will not affirm a 90-year sentence imposed on a juvenile without consideration of the protections afforded by section 5-4.5-105(a). We invoke Sullivan by analogy to underscore that when a court proceeds under an incomplete legal framework, the resulting judgment cannot be deemed reliable. See generally Johnson,2024 IL 130191, ¶ 90 (categorizing errors under prong two). The appropriate remedy is to reverse and remand for a new resentencing hearing. See People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 369 (1999)(“Where a trial court’s exercise of discretion has been frustrated by an erroneous rule of law, appellate review is required to permit the exercise of discretion consistent with the law.”).
To be sure, our decision neither reweighs factors nor imposes a sentence. See People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 215 (2010)
(reversing judgment of appellate court reducing sentencing and reinstating sentence trial court imposed). Rather, we direct the sentencing court to exercise its discretion within the bounds of the law when resentencing Evans. See Williams, 188 Ill. 2d at 369.
Because the sentencing court proceeded under a truncated framework, on remand, it must conduct a new sentencing hearing under the full statutory scheme, weighing all 12 factors, and imposing a sentence consistent with supreme court precedent, this decision, and the Code. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West2024).”
