The People v. Y.D. 2026 LEXIS 1633 (CA. 2026)

The California Court of Appeals, Sixth District, reversed the disposition order for Y.D., finding that a probation condition requiring Y.D. to “participate in and complete any appropriate programs as directed by [his] Probation officer” “impermissibly grants Y.D.’s probation unfettered discretion to determine program or programs that Y.D. must attend and complete.” The Court reversed the disposition order, requiring the court to specify the “nature and substance of the programs Y.D. must complete.”

The court reasoned in part, “As written, condition 11 impermissibly grants Y.D.’s probation officer unfettered discretion to determine the program or programs that Y.D. must attend and complete. Far from providing any guidance or limit on what programs the probation officer may require Y.D. to attend, the condition simply states that Y.D. is “to participate in and complete any appropriate programs as directed by [his] Probation Officer.” (Italics added.) This condition empowers the probation officer to require Y.D. to attend and complete programs without any direction on the subject of the program, its nature, its substance, its frequency, or its duration—including whether the programs permit him to remain home (after release from the secure facility) or require him to participate in a residential program. Moreover, the specification that the programs must be “appropriate” does not meaningfully cabin the probation officer’s discretion to require participation in programs. Far more limited delegations have been held impermissible. (See Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 903 [holding impermissible delegation of authority permittingprobation officer to choose between residential and outpatient substance abuse programs]; People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 952 [holding impermissible delegation of authority permitting probation officer to authorize probationer to attend court proceedings and otherwise barring probationer from attending court proceedings unless a party or witness]; see also United States v. Esparza (2009) 552 F.3d 1088, 1091 [holding impermissible delegation of authority permitting probation officer to choose whether required treatment would be inpatient or outpatient].)

The Attorney General acknowledges that, considered in isolation, condition 11 “could seem problematically open-ended.” However, he asserts that condition 11 must be read in context to permit only programming related to other conditions identifying Y.D.’s needs with respect to subjects such as gang affiliation, seeking work, drug use,and family dynamics. We are not persuaded. Condition 11 is one of a dozen standard terms and conditions imposed by the juvenile court that appear at the beginning of the memorandum adopted by the court. By contrast, all but one of the conditions cited by the Attorney General appear later in the list. Nothing in condition 11 suggests that the authority it delegates is limited to the subjects identified by the Attorney General. Nor is condition 11 reasonably read to be limited to the one standard condition identified by the Attorney General. That condition relates to school attendance, and nothing in that condition or condition 11 suggests that the juvenile court intended to delegate to the probation officer authority to require participation in educational programs.

Accordingly, the juvenile court must modify condition 11 to specify the nature and substance of the programs Y.D. must complete at the probation officer’s direction, including whether or not they are to be residential, that is, inpatient or outpatient.”