Spring 2026 Resource Library Updates
The Gault Center has been regularly updating our Resource Library, where you will find a broad range of youth defense resources to enhance your practice and advocacy. Below are some notable publications from the past few months that may be of interest to youth defense advocates. Please note that some of these resources are only available to registered youth defense users; to access, please log in or register on the Gault Center’s website.
From the Gault Center
Revolutionizing Probation from Punishment to Community-Led Safety, Part I
The Gault Center and Youth Empowerment for Advancement Hangout (YEAH Philly) released Part I of our Revolutionizing Probation series as part of our Juvenile Probation Accountability Coalition. Part I introduces a framework to shift narratives and practices around juvenile probation to move away from punishment and toward possibility for all youth. This report highlights youth perspectives on juvenile probation, finding that young people are experiencing probation as surveillance, control, and punishment, negatively impacting their mental health and wellbeing. This report also walks through the historical lineage of probation as a form of racialized social control to challenge dominant narratives that probation is a benign act of benevolence on behalf of youth. Part II of this report will be released in summer 2026, highlighting concrete steps to transform local probation practices and policies and spotlighting examples of successful practices already underway. An executive summary of Part I is also available. In addition, please check out this recent article covering our report.
Caselaw Updates
Commonwealth v. Donovan, 497 Mass. 355 (Mass. 2026)
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that a transfer hearing is a “critical stage of the criminal process” that requires effective assistance of counsel under the 6th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Court held that defense counsel’s failure to present evidence on youthfulness, developmental maturity, and rehabilitation prevented the judge from considering factors critical to the transfer decision. The Court emphasized, “A transfer hearing in many cases is ‘the whole ball game.’ A ‘thoughtful presentation by defense counsel directed at both [probable cause and whether, in view of the defendant’s maturity and rehabilitation, transfer is apt] is thus critical.’ Because a § 72A transfer hearing presents such consequential stakes, a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel.” (citations omitted). This decision strengthens young people’s constitutional right to counsel at transfer hearings and emphasizes the critical importance of effective youth defense counsel to raise arguments around developmental maturity to prevent against unnecessary transfer of youth to adult court.
Commonwealth v. Lee, 2026 Pa. LEXIS 553 (Pa. 2026)
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ended the use of mandatory life without parole for felony murder cases based on the state constitution’s prohibition against cruel punishment. Finding that Pennsylvania’s constitutional safeguards against cruel punishment offers greater protections than the 8th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the Court reasoned that the blanket imposition of mandatory life without parole absent an individual consideration of culpability heightens the risk of disproportionate punishment. The Court also noted that the practice of sentencing an individual to mandatory life without parole for felony murder cases where intent is essentially immaterial does not meet the goals of rehabilitation, deterrence, retribution, or incapacitation (i.e., the traditional penological justifications for criminal punishment). Accordingly, the Court finds that the Pennsylvania state constitution prohibits mandatory life without parole for felony murder cases and holds that there must be an individualized determination at sentencing. This decision reflects the opportunity to challenge mandatory sentences for felony murder cases based on heightened state constitutional principles. In addition, the Antiracism and Community Lawyering Practicum at Boston University School of Law, Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund submitted an amicus brief on this case highlighting several racial justice arguments that defenders may also reference to build effective challenges to felony murder cases from a racial justice lens.
State v. Mann-Tate, 2026 WI App 17 (Wis. Ct. App. 2026)
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin held that the state’s reverse waiver statute was unconstitutional “to the extent it does not require circuit courts to consider the unique attributes of youth identified by the United States Supreme Court.” In Wisconsin, a youth’s case that is directly filed in adult criminal court may be sent to juvenile court in a “reverse waiver” procedure if the youth proves by a preponderance of the evidence three statutory factors: that the youth could not receive adequate treatment in the adult, criminal system; that sending the case to juvenile court would not depreciate the seriousness of the offense; and that retaining jurisdiction in adult, criminal court is not necessary for deterrence. Relying on Miller v. Alabama and its progeny, the Court of Appeals held that the same considerations of adolescent development are constitutionally relevant at the transfer stage pursuant to a young person’s due process rights under the 14th Amendment. The Court of Appeals stated, “The reverse waiver procedure is rendered functionally meaningless if courts are not required to consider that children’s ‘lack of maturity and … underdeveloped sense of responsibility’ leads them to poor decision making. This concept is so fundamental that the Supreme Court described it as something ‘any parent knows.’” (citation omitted). As such, the Court of Appeals held that reverse waiver determinations must consider the following six Miller factors to comport with the demands of due process: 1) youth’s age and adolescent development, 2) family and home environment, 3) circumstances of the offense, 4) impact of peer pressure, 5) effect of age in ability to navigate the legal system, and 6) the possibility of rehabilitation. This decision extends the Miller factors to transfer/reverse transfer determinations and offers a compelling argument to strengthen developmental considerations at the transfer phase under a due process framework.
From the Field
Eugenic Criminology and the Birth of Predictive Algorithms in Criminal Justice
This law review article written by Professors Megan T. Stevenson and Robynn J.A. Cox uncovers the eugenic origins of risk assessment tools and highlights how modern-day uses of risk assessments for preventive detention still perpetuate eugenic criminology, albeit with new terminology. This article challenges the ongoing influence of eugenics in identifying who is “high risk” and “dangerous,” which the authors argue “may simply be the modern equivalents of ‘degeneracy’ and ‘defectiveness.’” This article offers a caution for defenders and advocates to examine the underlying historical roots of risk assessment instruments to critically evaluate manifestations of its eugenics foundation in modern-day practice.
Time Out for Transfer: Youth Transfer as Punishment
This law review article written by Professor Kristina Kersey explores transfer as a form of punishment and calls for jurisdictions to enact a moratorium on transfer, drawing lessons from the movement to end the death penalty. Noting similarities between transfer and the death penalty, this article analogizes the two and argues that transfer mechanisms operate to punish youth before a finding of guilt—achieving neither retributive justice nor deterrence, while failing to decrease recidivism or improve public safety. This article also highlights the staggering racial disparities that taint transfer practices across the country and connects its prevalence to the racialized history of the juvenile court system. Given these factors, the article calls for a moratorium to immediately halt the practice of transferring youth to adult court to study and evaluate its necessity. This article offers key policy considerations and comparative analyses for defenders and advocates to challenge the prevalence of transferring youth to adult court in their local jurisdictions.
